THE INVISIBLE POWER OF MACHINES:
REVISITING THE PROPOSED FLASH ORDER
BAN IN THE WAKE OF THE FLASH CRASH
AUSTIN J. SANDLER1

ABSTRACT
Technological innovation continues to make trading and
markets more efficient, generally benefitting market participants
and the investing public. But flash trading, a practice that evolved
from high-frequency trading, benefits only a select few
sophisticated traders and institutions with the resources necessary
to view and respond to flashed orders. This practice undermines
the basic principles of fairness and transparency in securities
regulation, exacerbates information asymmetries and harms
investor confidence. This iBrief revisits the Securities and
Exchange Commission’s proposed ban on the controversial
practice of “flash trading” and urges the Securities and Exchange
Commission and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission to
implement the ban across the securities and futures markets.
Banning flash trading will not impact high-frequency trading or
other advantageous innovative trading practices, and will benefit
all market participants by making prices and liquidity more
transparent. In the wake of the May 6, 2010 “flash crash” and the
passage of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act, now is an opportune time for the Securities and
Exchange Commission and Commodity Futures Trading
Commission to implement the ban.

INTRODUCTION
Over the last twenty years, technological innovations in
computerized securities transactions transformed the ways investors
understand markets and make trades. Transactions in securities, futures, and
other derivatives are increasingly moving away from physical exchanges
and onto electronic communications networks (ECNs).2 In 1998, the
¶1
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Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) recognized and embraced the
potential of these ECNs and other alternative trading systems (ATSs) by
adopting the Regulation of Exchanges and Alternative Trading Systems
(Regulation ATS).3 Then-SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt’s delivered a speech
seven months prior to the adoption of Regulation ATS, expressing his belief
that new trading technologies would have a transformative impact on
financial markets.4 Chairman Levitt’s prediction proved true, and aspects of
the technology-driven transformation of securities trading introduced new
regulatory challenges and risks to the stability of financial markets.
There are specific risks and regulatory concerns associated with
automated high-frequency computerized trading methods. The ë

by an exchange market maker or over-the-counter market maker, and permits
such orders to be executed in whole or in part.” DIV. OF MKT. REGULATION, SEC.
& EXCH. COMM’N, SPECIAL STUDY: ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
AND AFTER-HOURS TRADING (2000), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/ecnafter.htm; see Jerry W. Markham & Daniel
J. Harty, For Whom the Bell Tolls: The Demise of Exchange Trading Floors and
the Growth of ECNs, 33 J. CORP. L. 865, 866 (2008) (describing the “amazing
growth of the ECNs and their displacement of the traditional exchanges,” and
observing the changes in competition between exchanges and the regulatory
challenges associated with this growth).
3
Regulation of Exchanges and Alternative Trading Systems, Exchange Act
Release No. 34-40760, 63 Fed. Reg. 70,844 (Dec. 22, 1998) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. pts. 202, 240, 242, 249). As a background matter, ATSs are defined
broadly in the Regulation as “any organization, association, person, group of
persons, or system” that performs “functions commonly performed by a stock
exchange.” Id. at 70,847; see generally Mark Klock, The SEC’s New Regulation
ATS: Placing the Myth of Market Fragmentation Ahead of Economic Theory
and Evidence, 51 FLA. L. REV. 753, 764–68 (1999) (providing a brief overview
of Regulation ATS).
4
Chairman Levitt stated that the purpose of his speech was “to address the
developments both of technology and change affecting . . . markets.” He began
his remarks with the following paragraph:
We are at a unique moment in our markets’ history—a point of
passage between what they have been and what they will
become. In the next few years, they will undergo a
transformation like we have never witnessed before. And, it is
these changes that will define the marketplace for the 21st
century. We have an opportunity today that we may not have
again in our lifetime—to realize the vision for a true national
market system—one that embraces our future as much as it
honors our past.
Arthur Levitt, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks at Columbia Law
School: Dynamic Markets, Timeless Principles (Sept. 23, 1999), available at
http://www.columbia.edu/cu/law/levitt/speech.pdf.
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crash of May 6, 20105 serves as an unsettling reminder of the
“invisible power of the machines,”6 and of the need for greater SEC and
Commodity Future Trading Commission (CFTC) scrutiny and oversight of
automated high-frequency trading methods.
¶2

This iBrief proceeds in three parts. Part I examines the mechanics
and supposed benefits of flash trades. Part II describes how flash trading
exacerbates information and market access asymmetries, undermining core
objectives of securities regulation, namely transparency, investor
confidence, and protection against systemic risk.7 The story of the May 6,
2010 flash crash illustrates these issues and how high-frequency trading
methods can destabilize financial markets. Finally, Part III concludes that
the SEC and CFTC must go beyond creating “circuit breakers” to
effectively mitigate risks and asymmetries associated with high-frequency
computerized trading and flash orders. A ban on flash trading will be an
¶3

5

During the afternoon of May 6, 2010, financial markets suddenly and sharply
declined before quickly recovering. Initially, the extreme volatility was a
mystery to observers, but officials and the financial press determined that
trading activity by high-frequency traders using automated trading software
overwhelmed exchanges and ECNs. See, e.g., Nelson D. Schwartz, Kansas
Identified as Trader in Market Plunge, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 2010, at B1,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/15/business/15trader.html?fta=y
(explaining that a rush of May 6 trading orders exceeded the capacity of the
New York Stock Exchange and then “flooded electronic exchanges,” and that
high volumes of rapid computerized trades overwhelmed the ability of
computers and systems processing those trades to keep up with orders). The
sequence of events on May 6 and some of its implications are discussed in Part
II infra.
6
Eric Rosenbaum, ‘Flash Crash’ Was Machines Run Amok: Poll,
THESTREET.COM, (May 16, 2010, 8:00 AM),
http://www.thestreet.com/story/10757582/1/flash-crash-was-machines-runamok-poll.html.
7
Systemic risk became a policymaking and regulatory concern following the
financial crisis of 2008, and is a central focus of the Dodd-Frank Act. DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
124 Stat. 1376 (2010), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW111publ203/pdf/PLAW-111publ203.pdf. The purpose of the Act is in part to
ensure financial stability, and it charges two new offices—the Financial Stability
Oversight Council and Office of Financial Research—with identifying and
mitigating threats to financial stability, and systemic risk specifically. Id. at
1376, 1392–1420. For an accessible definition of systemic risk, see Steven L.
Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 198–200 (2008) (defining systemic
risk as the risk of an economically harmful trigger event, such as a default or
drop in prices, triggering institutional or market failures resulting from linkages
between large financial institutions).
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important first step, but the debate over the benefits and risks associated
with emerging trading technologies promises to continue.8

I. THE MECHANICS AND SUPPOSED BENEFITS OF FLASH TRADING
A. The Technology: Expensive, Secretive, and Lucrative
Although the flash crash directed the glare of the media’s attention
onto high-frequency traders, their world remains obscure and secretive, and
their methods highly-lucrative.9 The technology behind high-frequency
trading and flash trading is expensive, but the potential for considerable
profits leads large financial institutions to make significant investments in
proprietary software development.10 These trading methods are obscure, the
technology behind them is highly-sought after, their details are kept secret,
and their implications for the market are uncertain.11
¶4

8

Discourse within agencies and in the media is ongoing as agencies consider
appropriate regulatory approaches under the Dodd-Frank Act, which vests them
with “vast new authorities.” Scott D. O’Malia, Comm’r, Commodity Futures
Trading Comm’n, Opening Statement of the 2010 Technology Advisory
Committee (Oct. 12, 2010), available at
http://www.cftc.gov/pressroom/speechestestimony/omaliastatement101210.html
(opening another round of debate regarding possible regulatory responses to
high frequency and algorithmic trading under the Dodd-Frank Act, and noting
media and market participants’ attention to the subject following the May 6 flash
crash).
9
See Charles Duhigg, Stock Traders Find Speed Pays, in Milliseconds, N.Y.
TIMES, July 24, 2009, at A1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/24/business/24trading.html (explaining how
computerized high-frequency trading systems that are “so fast they can outsmart
or outrun other investors, humans and computers alike” enjoy an advantage over
other traders and investors, and that high-frequency traders generated an
estimated $21 billion in profits in 2008 from these systems alone).
10
See Alex Berenson, Arrest Over Software Illuminates a Secret of Wall St.,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 2009, at A1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/24/business/24trading.html?fta=y (telling the
story of the arrest of a former Goldman Sachs software developer accused of
bringing his work to another firm, and noting that profits from “highly
competitive . . . ultrafast trading” have “led to a gold rush, with hedge funds and
investment banks dangling million-dollar salaries at software engineers”).
11
One recent news article captures the concern surrounding this fast-emerging
trading market and its secretiveness:
Little understood outside the securities industry, the business has
suddenly become one of the most competitive and controversial
on Wall Street. At its heart are computer programs that take
years to develop and are treated as closely guarded secrets. . . .
Defenders of the programs say they make trading more efficient.

2011

DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW

No. 003

B. The Mechanics of Flash Trading
As individuals and institutions buy and sell securities, exchanges
and ATSs are legally required to execute orders at the best publicly-quoted
prices for buyers and sellers.12 They fulfill this requirement by searching for
market participants willing to trade with other exchanges or markets,13 and
are obligated under Regulation National Market System (Regulation NMS)
and Regulation ATS to display that information.14 Flash orders, however,
are excepted from these regulations.15
¶5

Flash trading evolved from high-frequency computerized trading
software. It is the controversial practice of high-frequency traders viewing
other traders’ orders and trading activity—during the brief window before
those orders go through—and then trading or not trading based on that
information.16
¶6

All flash orders share several basic features.17 When exchanges or
ATSs cannot identify a willing seller for a security at the best publiclyquoted price, they flash the order to a select group of its market
¶7

Critics say they are . . . a tax on long-term investors and can . . .
worsen market swings.
Berenson, supra note 10.
12
17 C.F.R. § 242.602 (2010); 17 C.F.R. § 242.301(b) (2010).
13
Fact Sheet, Sec & Exch. Comm’n, Banning Marketable Flash Orders: Open
Meeting of the Securities and Exchange Commission (Sept. 17, 2009),
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-201-factsheet.htm [hereinafter
BANNING MARKETABLE FLASH ORDERS].
14
17 C.F.R. § 242.602 (2010); 17 C.F.R. § 242.301(b) (2010).
15
Regulation NMS excepts exchanges from displaying quotations for flash
orders in paragraph (a)(1)(i)(A) of Rule 602. 17 C.F.R. § 242.602 (2010). The
SEC has applied this exception to ATSs. See Elimination of Flash Order
Exception from Rule 602 of Regulation NMS, 74 Fed. Reg. 48,632, 48,634
(proposed Sept. 18, 2009) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 242), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2009/34-60684fr.pdf [hereinafter “Proposed
Ban”] (“Consistent with the language in Rule 602 excepting exchanges from
including flash orders in the consolidated quotation data, the Commission has
not applied Rule 301 to include flash orders in the consolidated quotation
data.”).
16
Scott Patterson, Kara Scannell, & Geoffrey Rogow, Ban on Flash Orders Is
Considered by SEC: Shapiro Sees Inequity While Exchanges Wrestle for Market
Share in High-Speed Trading, WALL ST. J., Aug. 5, 2009, at C1, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124940289965505053.html (“In a flash order, a
firm wishing to buy or sell a stock can elect to freeze the order on an exchange
for as long as half a second. This move can have several effects, one of which
concerns a system of rebates and fees on trading orders.”).
17
For a detailed description of the basic features of flash orders, see Proposed
Ban, supra note 15, at 5–9.
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participants—those equipped with the requisite high-speed technology—to
seek out sellers who do not publicly display their sell price.18 Highfrequency traders can respond, “within a fraction of a second, . . . with their
own order to execute against the flashed order.”19 Market participants able
to view these flashed orders can take advantage of possible price arbitrage
opportunities or other financial benefits, including fees and rebates for using
different exchanges or ATSs.20
Exchanges and ATSs make this trading and arbitraging method
possible for the benefit of participants with the means to take advantage of
these opportunities.21 The practice may also provide broader benefits to
financial markets.
¶8

C. The Supposed Benefits of Flash Trading
Flash trading provides some benefits to markets, at least to those
market participants able to engage in the practice. Flashed orders may create
additional liquidity by attracting traders unwilling to display their trading
interest.22 Exchanges and ATSs can use flashing to increase the chances of
executing a transaction that they will not be able to execute in the displayed
quotations markets.23 Flashing may enhance the ability of exchanges, albeit
for a limited number of transactions, to facilitate trading “where they
believe an order is less likely to receive a full execution if routed
elsewhere.”24 Proponents of flash orders also point to the fact that
¶9

18

BANNING MARKETABLE FLASH ORDERS, supra note 13. These market
participants—ATSs that do not display quotations to the investing public—are
known as “dark pools of liquidity,” and in 2009, the SEC estimated that roughly
thirty dark pools exist, and that dark pool trading accounted for 7.2% of the total
share volume in stocks trading in those pools. Fact Sheet, Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n, Strengthening the Regulation of Dark Pools (Oct. 21, 2009),
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-223-fs.htm.
19
BANNING MARKETABLE FLASH ORDERS, supra note 13.
20
Id.
21
See, e.g., Dark Pools, Flash Orders, High Frequency Trading, and Other
Market Structure Issues: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Secs., Ins., & Inv. of
the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 3 (2009)
(statement of Frank Hathaway, Senior Vice President and Chief Economist,
NASDAQ QMX), available at
http://banking.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Files.View&FileStore_i
d=7fea4a79-e829-44d6-831f-44c7e1640e4d) (describing NASDAQ’s former
practice of offering flash orders).
22
Proposed Ban, supra note 15, at 48,637.
23
Id.
24
Id.
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competitive fees and rebates benefit traders, and incent them to submit flash
orders in these scenarios.25
Flash orders may also benefit institutional investors. Intermediaries
representing large financial institutions or institutional investors, often
reluctant to reveal their trading interests and strategies, may nevertheless be
“willing to step up on an order-by-order basis and provide liquidity to flash
orders.”26 The institutional investors benefit from their anonymity on the
contra side of a flash order and from lower transaction costs, while the
market benefits from the added liquidity.27
¶10

Flash trading offers benefits to some actors in the market. But flash
trading’s lack of transparency, the information asymmetries it creates, and
its impact on investor confidence outweigh these benefits.
¶11

II. THE FLASH CRASH: AN UNSETTLING REMINDER THAT HIGHFREQUENCY TRADING CAN DESTABILIZE MARKETS, UNDERMINE
SECURITIES REGULATION PRINCIPLES, AND DAMAGE INVESTOR
CONFIDENCE
A. The Flash Crash
The May 6, 2010 “flash crash” is a recent and illustrative example
of the potential risks to financial markets posed by high-frequency
computerized trading.28 The press termed the event the “flash crash” for its
suddenness, but also because of the catchy name’s connection to highfrequency trading, including flash trades and other high-tech, ultrafast
computerized trading methods.29
¶12

25

Id. (“[M]any markets that display quotations charge fees . . . . Flash orders
may be executed through the flash process for lower fees . . . . Indeed, some
markets have offered rebates on orders that are executed during a flash, so that
the order, rather than paying a fee, will earn a rebate.”)
26
Id. at 48,638.
27
Id.
28
For an overview of the sudden and dramatic plunge of the stock market on
May 6, 2010 and its rapid recovery, see generally COMMODITY FUTURES
TRADING COMM’N & SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, PRELIMINARY FINDINGS
REGARDING THE MARKET EVENTS OF MAY 6, 2010 (2010), available at
http://www.sec.gov/sec-cftc-prelimreport.pdf [hereinafter PRELIMINARY
FINDINGS].
29
See Rosenbaum, supra note 6 (summarizing different theories on the causes of
the May 6 market irregularities). To be clear, not all high-frequency trading
involves flash orders. Flash trading is a high-frequency trading method, and it
makes up only “a small fraction of high-speed transactions,” although “they
have drawn the most criticism from investors and traders.” Edgar Ortega &
Jesse Westbrook, SEC to Ban Flash Trades of U.S. Stocks, Schumer Says,
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Though not triggered by flash trading, the crash is a potent reminder
of the importance of price transparency in markets, and of the fact that
safeguarding investor confidence is as important as safeguarding the
stability of financial markets. And although officials from the SEC and
CFTC acknowledged that their agencies “had not been able to pinpoint the
cause of the sharp market decline” on May 6,30 the agencies blamed “heavy
reliance by investors on automated orders to sell . . . once stock prices had
declined a certain amount,” along with a wave of automated short selling.31
¶13

The secretive nature of high-frequency trading added to the mystery
of the crash for the general public as for the agencies. The lack of trading
transparency in the world of high-frequency trading obscured not only the
causes of the market irregularities, but also hindered authorities’
investigation of the event. Problematically, traders and institutions linked to
the flash crash by their high-volume transactions hid behind their “trading
strategies,” with one mutual fund under investigation refusing to cooperate
on the grounds that, by doing so, it was protecting its proprietary trading
methods and its investors.32 Months later, while government officials still
struggled to explain the exact cause of the flash crash,33 the practices of
high-frequency traders—whose trading activity comprises “40 to 70 percent
of all trading on every stock market in the country”—came under
heightened government and media scrutiny.34
¶14

BLOOMBERG.COM, Aug. 4, 2009,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a_PAIU9jvWW
A.
30
Edward Wyatt & Graham Bowley, After Crash, Trial Plan for S.&P., N.Y.
TIMES, May 19, 2010, at B1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/19/business/19crash.html?hp.
31
Id.
32
Eric Rosenbaum, New ‘Flash Crash’ Theory: Report, THESTREET.COM, (May
14, 2010, 3:27 PM), http://www.thestreet.com/story/10757345/1/new-flashcrash-theory-report.html.
33
See, e.g., Graham Bowley, Stock Swing Still Baffles, Ominously, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 23, 2010, at B1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/23/business/23flash.html (discussing
speculation and theories as to the cause of the May 6 price swing, including the
possibility of improper or manipulative activity; the conspiracy theory “that
shadowy computer masterminds were trying to disrupt the nation’s stock
trading;” that traders were “testing their high-speed computers, perhaps to see
how rivals would react;” or “that the computers produced so much data so
quickly that exchanges simply could not cope with the onslaught”).
34
Julie Creswell, Speedy New Titans of Trading Make Waves Far From Wall
St., N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 2010, at A1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/17/business/17trade.html?hp.
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On September 30, 2010, the SEC and CFTC published a joint
report, which concluded that an algorithmic trading program triggered a
massive automated futures sell-off by a large institutional investor. The
effect of the sell-off on the market was compounded by the computerized
responses of high-frequency traders across futures and securities markets.36
The findings in the report represent an opportunity for the SEC and CFTC
to assess and mitigate the risks and asymmetries enabled by high-speed
trading technologies across markets, and an opportunity to revisit the SEC’s
proposed ban on flash orders. Meetings, hearings, and media discourse on
the subject continue.37
¶15

35

B. How Flash Trading Undermines Basic Principles of Securities
Regulation
1. Remembering Market Manipulation and Lack of Trading Transparency
in the 1920s and 1930s
¶16
Cutting-edge technologies and current trading practices benefitting
the few powerful institutions able to afford them, at the expense of the
35

COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N & SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N,
FINDINGS REGARDING THE MARKET EVENTS OF MAY 6, 2010: REPORT OF THE
STAFFS OF THE CFTC AND SEC ON THE JOINT ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON
EMERGING REGULATORY ISSUES (2010), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2010/marketevents-report.pdf [hereinafter
FINDINGS].
36
Id. at 1–2, 13–16. In just twenty minutes, the fund’s program sold 75,000
futures contracts, totaling $1.4 billion in value, and even accelerated its selling
in response to plunging prices resulting from the sell-off and from trading
activity triggered by the sell-off. Graham Bowley, Lone Sale of $4.1 Billion in
Contracts Led to ‘Flash Crash’ in May, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2010, at B1,
available at, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/02/business/02flash.html.
37
For example, on October 12, 2010, the CFTC held a Technology Advisory
Committee meeting to address, in part, the “new challenges” posed by “uses of
technology, such as algorithmic and high-frequency trading, co-location, and
electronic trading facilities.” Gary Gensler, Chairman, Commodity Futures
Trading Comm’n, Opening Statement Before the Technology Advisory
Committee (Oct. 12, 2010), available at
http://www.cftc.gov/pressroom/speechestestimony/genslerstatement101210.
html. Popular news and television shows also address high-frequency trading
and flash trading. See, e.g., 60 Minutes: The Speed Traders (CBS television
broadcast, Oct. 10, 2010), available at
http://www.cbsnews.com/video/watch/?id=6945451n; The Daily Show with Jon
Stewart: Cash Cow – High-Frequency Trading (Sept. 30, 2009), available at
http://www.thedailyshow.com/watch/wed-september-30-2009/cash-cow---highfrequency-trading (taking a humorous, albeit simplified, view of high-frequency
trading and the perceived information asymmetries created by the practice).
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investing public and the stability of financial markets, recall securities
trading practices of the 1920s and 30s. Some of these then-unregulated
practices included “pooling” agreements;38 the use of shell companies to
move and hide assets to limit shareholder rights and influence;39 the use of
affiliated companies to short a parent company’s stock;40 and the practice of
issuing stock at different prices to different investors, some receiving
securities at favorably low prices compared to the higher-priced securities
available to the general investing public.41 These practices were obscure for
years and conducted behind closed doors, but government investigations,
public outrage, and intensified scrutiny by the press helped to pave the way
for the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which sought to extinguish such
abuses in secondary markets.42 This iBrief suggests there is a similar
38

“Pooling” operations consisted of large individual and institutional investors
collaborating to buy large amounts of a given security, promote the security
through advertisements to the investing public (thereby artificially inflating the
price), only to then simultaneously sell soon after, reaping large profits while
collapsing the market price of the stock. CHARLES R. GEISST, WALL STREET: A
HISTORY FROM ITS BEGINNINGS TO THE FALL OF ENRON 182–83 (2004).
39
See JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET: A HISTORY OF
THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE
FINANCE 25–26 (3d ed. 2003) (explaining First National Bank’s issuance of
nonvoting shares of affiliated corporations with sale restrictions printed on the
back of the certificates); see also Frank Partnoy, Essay, Historical Perspectives
on the Financial Crisis: Ivan Krueger, The Credit-Rating Agencies, and Two
Theories about the Function, and Dysfunction, of Markets, 26 YALE J. ON REG.
431, 433–34 (telling the story of the infamous Ivan Kreuger and his use of offshore subsidiaries, balance sheet manipulations, and asset transfers to conceal
his liabilities from the investing public and auditors, and then comparing
Kreuger’s use of innovative structures to the complex transactions in modern
financial markets that use similar subsidiary entities and off-balance sheet
transactions to disguise or conceal risks or financial liabilities).
40
See SELIGMAN, supra note 39, at 78 (describing the “stunning revelation[]”
that Chase National Bank had formed and orchestrated the activities of six
separate, private corporations, including one corporation that earned Chase
National Bank millions of dollars in profit by short-selling Chase National
Bank’s stock—from the inside of the Bank’s building—during the 1929 stock
market crash).
41
See GEISST, supra note 38, at 224–25 (explaining banks’ practices in the
1920s and 1930s of maintaining “preferred lists” and charging lower fees to
special customers and public officials).
42
G. Wright Hoffman, writing in 1935, described how hearings revealing these
trading practices showed the investing public that powerful institutions were
able to trade based on insider knowledge. The environment of information
asymmetry necessitated the passage of legislative reforms. “As the story
unfolded it became increasingly evident that . . . ‘insiders’ were thriving upon a
body of facts quite different from those offered for public consumption. At the
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confluence of practices in flash trading today, and urges the SEC and CFTC
to use today’s regulatory momentum to reaffirm the original principles
behind the 1934 landmark legislation.
The Exchange Act created the SEC to carry out and enforce the
Act’s disclosure principles, protecting investors by bringing transparency to
financial markets and by limiting information asymmetries.43 The flash
crash revealed not only how new trading methods can destabilize markets
and damage investor confidence, but also how they erode the securities
regulation principles of fairness and transparency. The regulatory answers
to challenges presented by flash trading must reinforce these principles.
¶17

2. Flash Trading Threatens Basic Regulatory Principles
¶18
Flash trading undermines basic principles of fairness and
transparency in markets by creating a “two-tiered” information market that
conceals prices and price disparities from the public. The SEC’s flash
trading ban proposal articulates the agency’s concerns about the
manipulation of these market indicators:
The Commission . . . is concerned that flash orders may create a twotiered market in which the public does not have access . . . to
information about the best available prices for listed securities. A
flash order generally is displayed at a marketable price that will be
better than the best displayed price for the security in the consolidated
quotation data. . . . Yet the public does not receive this flashed order
information in the consolidated quotation data. Instead, only those
market participants that receive a market’s individual data feed have
access to the improved price information.44

One consequence of allowing flash trading to remain excepted from
the display requirements of Regulation NMS is that the practice will
continue to exacerbate information asymmetries and price disparities
between one select group, namely high-frequency traders taking advantage
of flash orders, and the rest of the investing community lacking the
technology to view those orders.
¶19

height of this exposure a new administration came into power committed to
reform. The Securities Exchange Act is one of several designed to accomplish
this purpose.” Wright Hoffman, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, in WALL
STREET AND THE SECURITY MARKETS 700, 701 (Vincent P. Carosso & Robert
Sobel eds., Arno Press reprint ed. 1975) (1935).
43
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78lll) targeted exchanges for the purposes of preventing
“inequitable and unfair practices on . . . exchanges and markets.”
44
Proposed Ban, supra note 15, at 48,636.
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In addition, market participants with the most advanced technology
can take advantage of flashed orders before those orders can be viewed and
filled elsewhere, using that information not to fulfill the order, but rather to
execute trades elsewhere based on such information.45 This exclusive
“sneak peek at market activity”46 is another clear example of an “inequitable
and unfair”47 practice permitted under the Regulation NMS exception for
flash orders.
¶20

Finally, the practice of flash trading threatens to undermine
investor confidence, a “hallmark of the federal securities laws for the last 75
years.”48 As the SEC noted in its ban proposal, flash trading “may give
professional short-term traders undue advantages without creating sufficient
corollary benefits to long-term investors.” 49 This disparity threatens to
“damage . . . public confidence in . . . markets.”50
¶21

Flash trading undermines fairness, transparency, and investor
confidence in financial markets. The negative aspects outweigh any
supposed benefits it provides.51
¶22

III. CIRCUIT BREAKERS ARE NOT ENOUGH: FAIRNESS,
TRANSPARENCY, AND INVESTOR CONFIDENCE DEMAND A BAN OF
FLASH ORDERS
The SEC and CFTC are currently testing “circuit breaker”
regulatory responses as a way to prevent recurrences of the price volatility
and automated mass sell-offs that occurred on May 6.52 The SEC asserts
¶23

45

See id. at 48,637 (“[M]arket participants with the fastest systems are able to
react to information in a shorter time frame than the length of the flash order
exposures. As a result, such a participant would be capable of receiving a
flashed order and reacting to it before the flashed order . . . could be executed
elsewhere.”).
46
Patterson, Scannell, & Rogow, supra note 16. See also Jacob Bunge, US
Regulators Seen Moving To Ban Dark Flash Orders Soon, MARKETWATCH.COM
(July 28, 2009), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/us-regulators-seen-movingto-ban-dark-flash-orders-soon-2009-07-28 (Noting that flash orders enable the
fastest high-frequency traders to “see how the market reacts to a flashed order
and then place equities bets accordingly.”).
47
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ch. 404.
48
Proposed Ban, supra note 15, at 48,638.
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
See id. (“[T]he Commission preliminarily believes that the benefits of flash
orders for some market participants do not justify their costs to other market
participants, the national market system, and the public interest.”).
52
See generally Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC to Publish for
Public Comment Stock-by-Stock Circuit Breaker Rule Proposals (May 18,
2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-80.htm. See also
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that circuit breakers will “promote investor confidence” by assuring
investors that “an individual stock . . . under stress” will not plunge below a
certain price in a given day.53 Reducing systemic risk by preventing wild
price fluctuations is a critical starting point, but mechanisms that merely
stop trading at signs of volatility or irregular trading patterns do not address
the transparency, fairness, and investor confidence issues created by highfrequency trading activities in general, and by flash orders in particular.

A. Circuit Breakers: Their Functions and Limitations
1. The Mechanics of Circuit Breakers
¶24
The SEC adopted an accelerated pilot program for circuit breakers
in the wake of the flash crash.54 The circuit breakers allowed exchanges and
markets to initiate five-minute trading pauses for individual securities “if
the transaction price of the security move[d] ten percent or more from a
price in the preceding five-minute period.”55 The listing exchange or market
that initiated the pause then immediately notified other exchanges and
market participants of the pause.56 After receiving notice, the other
exchanges and participants would likewise pause trading of that security in
their markets.57 Following the five-minute pause, the market that originated
the pause may either resume trading in the security, or prolong the pause for
an additional five minutes.58
After launching the accelerated pilot program to apply only to a
select group of securities,59 the SEC, based on comments from and in
collaboration with exchanges and market participants, then expanded the
¶25

Edward Wyatt & Graham Bowley, New Rules Proposed for S.&P. 500 Stocks,
N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 2010, at B1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/19/business/19crash.html?hp (describing how
proposed circuit breaker rules will pause trading in stocks for predetermined
amounts of time if stock prices rise or fall by 10 percent or more in a fiveminute period).
53
PRELIMINARY FINDINGS, supra note 28, at 77.
54
Order Granting Accelerated Approval to Proposed Rule Changes Relating to
Trading Pauses Due to Extraordinary Market Volatility, 75 Fed. Reg. 34,186
(proposed June 10, 2010), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-201006-16/pdf/2010-14435.pdf [hereinafter Order Granting Accelerated Approval].
See also Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Approves New Stock-byStock Circuit Breaker Rules (June 10, 2010), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-98.htm.
55
Order Granting Accelerated Approval, supra note 54, at 34,187.
56
Id.
57
Id.
58
Id.
59
Id.
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circuit breaker program in September 2010. 60 The proposal and pilot
program enjoyed broad support from exchanges, markets, and institutional
investors.61 Sudden fluctuations in prices of specific stocks have already
triggered the circuit breakers, demonstrating their effectiveness as a
response to extreme price irregularities.62 The program will soon apply
across all U.S. securities and futures exchanges and markets.63
2. Circuit Breakers Mitigate Systemic Risk, But Fail to Address
Transparency and Fairness
¶26
The expansion of the circuit breaker pilot program reflects the
SEC’s and market participants’ confidence in its effectiveness. But the
circuit breakers respond only to extreme price volatility, providing markets
with the opportunity to assess irregular prices before sell-offs and other
responses can recreate events like the flash crash.64 The SEC recently
suggested that circuit breakers will also improve investor confidence in
markets,65 but only insofar as they bring stability to stock prices. They do
not address the fairness and transparency challenges posed by highfrequency trading, and by flash trading in particular. Therefore, the SEC,
together with the CFTC, should act with the same decisiveness with respect
to flash orders as it did in its implementation of circuit breakers.

60

SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, INVESTOR BULLETIN: NEW STOCK-BY-STOCK
CIRCUIT BREAKERS (2010), available at
http://www.sec.gov/investor/alerts/circuitbreakers.htm.
61
See Order Granting Accelerated Approval, supra note 54, at 34,187–88
(describing comment letters received from market participants as “generally
supportive,” with some expressing concerns); Graham Bowley, Circuit Breaker
Kicks In, Stopping Trades of Citigroup, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2010, at B1,
available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/30/business/30circuit.html?_r=1&ref=high_fr
equency_algorithmic_trading.
62
See, e.g., Bowley, supra note 61 (“Wall Street analysts said that the halting of
Citigroup’s shares on Tuesday highlighted the effectiveness of the mechanisms
being tested to prevent disruptive movements in share prices.”).
63
Id.
64
See Order Granting Accelerated Approval, supra note 54, at 34,187 (focusing
on “price volatility” and quoting institutional investors’ comments reinforcing
the stabilizing effect of trading pauses).
65
Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Approves Rules Expanding Stockby-Stock Circuit Breakers and Clarifying Process for Breaking Erroneous
Trades (Sept. 10, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010167.htm (quoting Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, who
noted that “[t]hese circuit breakers . . . will help our markets retain the
confidence of investors and companies . . . .”).
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B. The Next Step: Banning Flash Trading and Continuing the Debate
In its proposed ban of flash orders, the SEC’s “preliminary”
conclusion was that “the benefits of flash orders for some market
participants do not justify their costs to other market participants, the
national market system, and the public interest.”66 The SEC should adopt
the proposed ban on flash trading decisively and urgently, as it did when
implementing the circuit breaker pilot program.67
¶27

In addition to the modest first step of developing and implementing
circuit breaker protections, the SEC should establish an unambiguous ban
on computerized flash trading of securities and futures contracts,68 a
measure contemplated in 200969 and revisited in the wake of the May 6
flash crash.70 A ban across all exchanges and trading platforms should
prohibit high-frequency traders from viewing other traders’ orders, and
should improve price transparency by removing the flash order exception in
Regulation NMS. Continued collaboration between the SEC and CFTC is
needed as history has revealed that market irregularities could arise first in
the futures market and spread to the securities market, and vice versa.71
¶28

Although select institutions benefit from flash trading, the practice
provides minimal benefits to the general investing public. Institutions with
the resources to execute flash trades benefit from an obvious informational
advantage, but the practice does not promote or even involve efficient
markets, self-disciplining markets, or other benefits such as price discovery
or market-wide liquidity.72 Although “most major U.S. stock platforms”
currently use dark orders to remain competitive internationally, many have
stated that “they would welcome the end of the ‘flash era.”73 Indeed,
¶29

66

Proposed Ban, supra note 15, at 48,638.
See Order Granting Accelerated Approval, supra note 54, at 34,187
(approving the circuit breaker pilot “on an accelerated basis,” and recognizing
“the importance of moving quickly to implement appropriate steps that could
help limit potential harm from extreme price volatility.”).
68
A debate is ongoing as to whether a ban on flash orders for options would be
desirable. This controversy is outside the scope of this iBrief, which argues that
a ban should apply at least across futures and securities markets.
69
Patterson, Scannell, & Rogow, supra note 16, at C1.
70
See PRELIMINARY FINDINGS, supra note 28, at 77 (mentioning proposals to
“prohibit flash orders and . . . increase the transparency of ‘dark’ pools of
liquidity”).
71
Id. at 74.
72
In fact, the opposite may be true. The SEC and CFTC determined that “the
interaction between automated execution programs and algorithmic trading
strategies can quickly erode liquidity and result in disorderly markets,” thereby
“lead[ing] to the breakdown of a fair and orderly price-discovery process.” See
FINDINGS, supra note 35, at 6.
73
Bunge, supra note 46.
67
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“[e]ven some of the firms and companies that use flash orders as part of
their operations have expressed serious concerns about the practice.”74
Institutional investors with the resources and the software necessary
to complete flash orders do not trade more intelligently than smaller
institutions or individuals when they engage in flash trading. They do not
trade on superior analysis. They simply trade faster, and do so by reacting to
trades placed but not yet executed by other investors. Thus, they respond to
information to which only a select group has access. This is fundamentally
inconsistent with the founding securities regulation principles of fairness
and transparency in markets. It also reinforces the public perception that a
select group of institutions benefits from more precise information than the
general public, a perception that undermines investor confidence.
¶30

Banning flash trading and conducting additional research for more
effective oversight of high-frequency trading practices will, in conjunction
with the implementation of effective circuit breaker mechanisms, provide
the benefits of fairness, transparency, price stability, and greater investor
confidence.75 Even proponents and users of flash orders acknowledge that
banning the practice will not remove the benefits provided to the market by
dark pools or high-frequency trading in general, and that a ban will not be
detrimental to their profits or operations.76
¶31

Systemic risk was a focus of the financial regulatory reform debate
in 2008 and 2009, but it took the May 6 flash crash to spur policymakers to
focus on the connection between rapid, automated trading technologies and
systemic risk.77 Circuit breakers are a sensible response to that specific risk,
but fail to address the other core regulatory challenges posed by flash
trading. With a proposed ban ready for implementation, industry and
political support,78 and ongoing collaborative efforts with the CFTC, the
¶32

74

Id.
This conclusion is consistent with the stated purpose of the proposed ban. See
id. at 48,641 (“The proposal is intended to prevent a two-tiered market in which
the public does not have access . . . to information about the best available prices
for listed securities, . . . and to help promote public confidence in the fairness of
the listed securities markets.”).
76
See Bunge, supra note 46 (noting that officials from BATS Exchange and
Direct Edge, two leading exchanges offering flash orders, expressed confidence
that a ban would not impact their overall businesses).
77
See e.g., Graham Bowley & Edward Wyatt, Wall St. Plunge Suggests Flaws in
Fast Trading, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 2010, at A1 (quoting Senator Christopher
Dodd’s observation that unregulated flash trading raises systemic risk issues and
his call for market-wide circuit breakers).
78
Well before the flash crash, policymakers called for bans to flash orders. See,
e.g., Whitney Kisling, Senator Urges ‘Immediate’ SEC Action on HighFrequency Trading, BLOOMBERG.COM, Nov. 20, 2009,
75
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SEC should aggressively move forward with its proposed ban by
eliminating the exception in Regulation NMS for flash orders.

CONCLUSION
Computers responding to public information faster than an
individual responds is neither new nor inherently wrong. The market
incentivizes and rewards innovation, including privately-developed and
-owned proprietary technology and the resourcefulness of market
participants. Greater transactional efficiency and faster responses to market
information generally support the SEC’s statutory objectives of efficiency
and capital formation.79 Non-institutional investors, far from being harmed
or disadvantaged, ordinarily benefit from competitive short-term trading.80
But the asymmetries and lack of transparency of flash trading is an example
of powerful machines invisibly eroding fair and transparent competition in
financial markets.
¶33

Tensions between financial innovation and the stability of financial
markets dominated the financial regulatory reform debate, which ultimately
led to the most significant reforms by lawmakers since the New Deal.81
High-frequency trading generally, and flash trading in particular, provide a
¶34

http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aO8DoToaITO8
(describing letters from U.S. Senators Ted Kaufman and Charles Schumer to the
SEC urging the Commission to take immediate action to ban flash orders).
79
“The mission of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission is to protect
investors, maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitate capital
formation.” SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, THE INVESTOR’S ADVOCATE: HOW THE
SEC PROTECTS INVESTORS, MAINTAINS MARKET INTEGRITY, AND FACILITATES
CAPITAL FORMATION, available at http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml
(last visited Oct. 5, 2010). See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(f) (2006) (requiring the agency
to “consider, in addition to the protection of investors, whether the action will
promote efficiency, competition, and capital formation.”). Congress requires the
agency to “consider, in addition to the protection of investors, . . . efficiency,
competition, and capital formation.” 15 U.S.C. § 78c (2006).
80
[M]any professional short-term traders devote substantial
resources to develop the systems and expertise to trade
successfully. . . . This competition among professional shortterm traders can greatly benefit long-term investors if it leads
to better execution quality (such as narrower spreads and
greater liquidity) when investors enter the market to establish
or liquidate their positions in a security.
Proposed Ban, supra note 15, at 48,638.
81
See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-111publ203/pdf/PLAW-111publ203.pdf.
Transparency in the financial system is one of the principal objectives of the
legislation. Id. at 1376.
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clear example of this tension, but until the May 6 flash crash, policymakers,
regulators, and the financial press did not publicly identify these trading
methods and technologies as a focus of the regulatory reform conversation.
The surprise and confusion surrounding the irregularity of financial
markets after the flash crash grabbed the attention of market participants,
public officials, and the press. The successful circuit breaker pilot program
was an important first step in preventing recurrences of the flash crash, but
it must be complemented by a ban on flash orders. Such a ban will not
impede innovation or the vast majority of high-frequency trading, but will
ensure that high-tech trading does not undermine fairness, transparency, or
investor confidence. Perhaps the flash crash triggered just the kind of urgent
regulatory intervention, bipartisan political will, and media attention
necessary for policymakers and regulators to carefully examine and
meaningfully regulate the new and powerful trading technologies that
promise to shape the future of trading in financial markets.
¶35

